Krysia Rybaczuk
Department of Environmental Sciences
Trinity College
Dublin 2 Ireland
krybczuk@vaxl.tcd.ie
and
Michael Blakemore
NOMIS Unit lL
Mountjoy Research Centre
Durham DH1 3SW
United Kingdom
internet: michael.blakemore@durham.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
The potential impacts of recent Anglo-American information policy developments on the dissemination and use of geographic information are examined. The role of government information is reviewed with respect to issues of funding, access, dissemination, pricing and marketing, and the impact of initiatives to reduce the size and costs of government.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s the UK Government has pursued a policy of aiming to reduce the size of government, deregulate, reduce taxes, increase efficiency and value-for-money. Processes to achieve this have included privatisation, and devolving the service functions of government to separate budget centres. These budget centres then service the policy functions, setting charges for external use of resources, and cross-charging for the internal government use of resources. In the category of resources is information, which increasingly is valued as a revenue-generating commodity. Could lead to information being available only to those who have money to purchase it? Such an outcome would run counter to other UK government pronouncements on 'Open Government', and on stating the importance of information being available for businesses and citizens. These potential contradictions are discussed in this paper.
The UK cannot be examined in isolation. It is part of the European Union, and is subject to emerging directives on issues such as data protection. Yet it also retains strong transatlantic links. There are similarities between the 'Re-Inventing Government' initiatives of the Clinton administration and the 'Executive Agencies' in the UK. Indeed there are formal links at a political level and these are noted in Hansard, the official record of the House of Commons. The USA has a formal constitutionally based philosophy of freedom of information, with open records laws, no federal copyright (see Tosta 1992), and data disseminated at minimal or no cost. These characteristics are often cited as examples of what UK policy should look like (Barr 1994). The influence, however, is not one way. The USA government also aims to reduce federal costs, lessen the influence of 'big government', and may also consider the potential impacts of some European initiatives.
2. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Government geographical information, dominantly in the forms of map data and official statistics, serves many roles. For example it is used for the development of policy, for the evaluation of government, for education, to determine political boundaries and for the allocation of resources. Information can be used to serve the democratic process, and it can be used against democracy for propaganda and social control. Information is in demand from all sectors, sometimes because legislation requires official information to be used, from research and development, or a commercial market demand.
Different nation states view the role of information dissemination in different ways. Historically the USA has been regarded as a liberal information culture, with the right to access government information being stated in the Constitution. This is supported by a Freedom of Information Act, open records laws in local government, and an absence of federal government copyright. The USA policy on dissemination of federal information states that only the residual cost of dissemination can be charged to users. The UK has a less open policy on dissemination, summarised by Plowden who reviewed the changing relationship between the UK civil service and politicians, recommending that
Subject to law it is the responsibility of Ministers and of the government as a whole to decide what information should reach the public domain. (Plowden 1994, 154)
A variety of dissemination, marketing and charging mechanisms are in use within the UK, although there is a clear commitment to disseminate data. In the case of the UK Central Statistical Office (CSO) the mission statement aims "To establish and maintain the CSO Executive Agency as a widely respected source of up-to date and reliable statistics on the UK economy and society". The Employment Department Group (Great Britain) Statistical Services Division has a twofold mission statement that is to deliver statistics to ministers, and to make data publicly available. The objectives of Statistics Finland (Tammilehto-Luode 1994) also stress wider dissemination
The UK government collect information from citizens and organisations, often under the protection of legislation such as Census Acts (HMSO 1991b). The Employment Department Group (GB) is specific on the vital importance of cooperation and collection, stating
Just as important [as users of information] are the people who supply information responding to our surveys, whether for themselves or on behalf of their firms. Without the cooperation of these suppliers we would not provide a good service to Government, nor to their fellow citizens. (Employment Department 1992)
Both citizens and organisations are 'taxpayers', and this term will be used in this discussion paper. The cooperation of taxpayers is essential to ensure that information is relevant, timely, and of a high quality. Taxpayers must not be burdened with excessive or unnecessary demands for information, otherwise there is a risk that cooperation and quality will suffer. Cooperation also may be reduced if taxpayers find they are being charged large amounts of money for information they contributed in the first place.
Willingness to provide and share information is an essential part of any democratic process. Public acknowledgment of the need to contribute to the national infrastructure could be prejudiced (quite apart from the known civil liberties concerns) if citizens are charged high prices to use data they provide freely. For data are not given freely, and there is always a cost in the time taken to fill forms. Consider the UK Census of Population in 1991, where estimates of the cost of collection and processing are about £140 million. If the form took on average one hour to fill in, and the number of enumerated households is 21,987,322 then at a basic cost of £10 per hour for time the taxpayers' opportunity cost of contributing data to the Census would be £218 million. This is some £78 million more than the reported cost of the Census. The UK CSO (CSO 1992) generally itemises the costs of compliance of its surveys on the basis that 'Compliance costs are based on the number of forms despatched, the time taken to complete each form and an estimated hourly rate of compliance'. For example, the Annual Census of Production aims for an 85% response rate at a compliance cost of £1,580,000.
The burden of information provision on businesses and citizens is considerable. While there are often legislative or formal processes that seek to avoid the proliferation of information demands (for example the USA Paperwork Reduction Act (House of Representatives 1990), and the UK Cabinet Office Survey Unit), there still is a delicate balance to be struck between providers and users of information.
3. FUNDING INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
The issue of 'who has access to information, and at what price?' is complex, and often also is emotional. A liberal argument, predominant in the USA, has been that the taxpayer funds the Government and therefore has already paid for the collection of the information. So why pay more to use it? A capitalist government may regard itself as a series of 'business sectors' operating on behalf of the taxpayers, and needing to reduce costs. Taxpayers can be viewed as being the equivalent of a board of directors that expects a return on investment. Selling data is one way of helping to achieve this. Conventionally, income to government has been mainly through sources of direct taxation, but those paying direct taxes are a declining cohort.
By the year 2020 in most countries there will be only three workers to pay for every person over 65 ... There is no way that successive generations are going to agree to pay huge taxes to keep their elders as comfortable as they have been. (Handy 1994, 191)
It is not surprising that governments are regarding indirect income (sales taxes, cost recovery, revenue generation through privatisation etc.) as becoming a more important source of revenue. Additionally the costs of government can be reduced through processes such as reducing the size of the civil service, through efficiency gains, better organisational structures and flexible working practices. One guaranteed way for a government to lose votes is to keep raising taxes on wage earners.
So, taxpayers both fund and use information. The debate on dissemination often focuses on a 'democratic' argument that everyone should have equal access to information, which conflicts with a desire to pay less in taxes to the government. This is the classic paradox of potentially infinite demand for information having to be funded by a finite resource base. Such a dilemma is at it's most emotive in health care provision. In the UK there is a rapid move to an internal health care market, and in the USA an early desire by the Clinton administration to provide health care for everyone despite their financial circumstances.
The USA federal situation on information funding is a form of financial top-slicing. The taxpayer is viewed as having already invested in the collection of information, so should not pay further (other than the residual cost of dissemination) for that information. Considerable care needs to be taken to ensure that unfair competition and monopoly control do not occur. In 1982 the U.S. House of Representatives noted
Federal data processing and communications resources must not be misdirected. With fewer resources available, Government should be using what it has to conduct its internal operations, not providing subsidized services to private businesses. (House of Representatives 1992, 1)
Long before the National Performance Review (Gore 1993) there was recognition of the internal priorities of dissemination, and of resource limitations. In 1986 the House of Representatives also examined the range of Federal electronic dissemination policies, warning that
The distribution of government information through electronic information systems, however, has a potential to allow Federal agencies to maintain a monopoly or near-monopoly over information. This potential arises because of the size, technical requirements, and expense of these systems. (House of Representatives 1986, 5)
So there may be a fear that massively subsidised federal dissemination could make it difficult, or even impossible, for private sector companies do develop similar services. Nevertheless, the act of disseminating at residual cost in the formats produced for internal use by an Agency or Department, does not in itself ensure that information is available in a directly usable format for all users. The considerable added-value information industry in the USA bears witness to the costs of turning data into information and intelligence. It could also be argued that USA Agencies may not have a strong enough customer focus if part or all of their funding is not dependent upon servicing those customers. In this debate on costs it is important to differentiate between costs of collection, rules for access, and costs of dissemination.
The situation in USA local government is less clearly defined. Despite open records laws there is a tendency to become more budget focused, and to view geographic and other information as a marketable resource. Lerner (1992) reviews the development of an information policy for Florida, USA. She notes the dilemma faced by local government in fulfilling request for information - would this threaten to detract from their main duties? Would user fees help to cover the costs, and would the private sector see this as local government unfairly competing with business? Lerner identifies such issues as the need to define what is reasonable access, formalise access methods, set justifiable charges. Foresman (1992) identifies similar issues for the state of Kentucky. Such developments seem more akin to the moves to budget centres and cost recovery in the UK, and serve to highlight the increasing complexity of the USA information market.
4. ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Is there a direct relationship between access to information, a just society and an efficient economy? A libertarian argument that everyone should have access to data assumes that someone will fund the mechanisms to disseminate data. The UK Government (HMSO 1994b, 1994c) has published codes of practice on access to information, and shared good practice for official statisticians, as part of its 'Open Government' initiative. While it rightly aims to balance release of data with the protection of commercial confidentiality and personal privacy, it does seem to assume that both the decision to release information, and the act of dissemination, are undertaken by civil servants. There is what could be interpreted as an 'opt-out' clause entitled 'Voluminous or vexatious requests'.
Requests for information which are vexatious or manifestly unreasonable or are formulated in too general a manner, or which (because of the amount of information to be processed or the need to retrieve information from files not in current use) would require unreasonable diversion of resources (HMSO 1994b, 8)
In 1994 the Consumers Association in the UK tested the open government code by writing letters to nine government departments. They note that the code has no legal basis, and is voluntary. There is one page of the code given to releasing information and 4.5 pages of exceptions. Any government Executive Agencies (see the reinventing government section below) and privatised functions are exempt from the code. Any appeals against refusal have to be directed through a member of Parliament. The Consumers Association found the implementation of the UK code to be most unsatisfactory.
Even with the constitutional availability of information, the USA has extremes of poverty and riches. It's health care provision is based on ability and willingness to pay, and the educational system that does not train everyone equally. There are high levels of crime.
As the Education Committee of Congress discovered, fewer than four in 10 young adults can summarise in writing the main arguments from a news column. Only 25 out of 100 young adults can use a bus schedule to work out how to get from here to there at a particular time. Only 10 per cent can select the least costly item from a list of grocery items on the basis of unit pricing information. (Handy 1994, 203)
This is in a society flooded with information and statistics. So, would charging help? The marketer would argue that 'people only value what they pay for'. The UK has its own social and economic problems, notably high levels of unemployment and poverty. The increasing marketing of geographical information on a user-pays basis also does not in itself seem to be leading to a better educated society and more efficient economy. There clearly is not a direct causal link between availability of information and the development of intelligence. Something else must be happening to create intelligence.
Could the opposite argument be made, that strict control over information and citizens can generate an efficient and safe society? A government such as Singapore protects official information with a draconian Official Secrets Act, yet has excellent health care and educational systems, and a very low crime rate. A trial in April 1994 found a Mr. Patrick Daniel guilty of receiving pre-release official statistics even though he had been sent them via electronic mail and not at his request. Even the involuntary acquisition of the statistics was enough to breach the Singapore Official Secrets Act. In September 1994 there were reports (Newsweek September 26, p38) that the lower house of parliament in Poland voted 268 to 75 in favour of new laws on state secrets that result in up to 10 years in prison for citizens that disclose information; this is in a new east European democracy that knows well the problems of former state suppression of information.
5. INFORMATION AS A COMMODITY
While idealists rightly argue from the basis of philosophy and principle, governments have been taking more pragmatic views about information provision. There have been two main motivations for this; ageing populations leading to a reduction in the direct tax base, and a need to increase the efficiency of government operations. A government such as the UK has been pursuing policies such as cost-recovery and privatisation (see Blakemore and Singh 1992). For geographic information, cost-recovery is best illustrated by the Ordnance Survey (Ordnance Survey 1994). The percentage of costs recovered from users has been 64% (1990-1991), 68% (1991-1992), 60% (1992-1993),71.8% (1993-1994). The goal in the Ordnance Survey's Corporate Plan (Ordnance Survey 1992) is 100% cost-recovery by 1997.
If full cost recovery is achieved there will be a natural temptation for government to privatise OS. Privatisation would assist the task of reducing the size of the civil service. There could be a large amount of cash for the government not only through the sale of the OS as a business, but also through the value of the mapping assets, often called the 'National Topographic Database'. But how do you value information within a business? Many businesses are regarded as 'info-businesses', but are the assets the information, or the skills in using the information?
For a long time now, corporate chairmen have been saying that their real assets were their people, but few really meant it and none went so far as to put these assets on their balance sheets. (Handy 1994, 23)
In many instances it seems that there is no attempt to value the information equity, and the Ordnance Survey (1994) in its annual report notes
The National Topographic Database consists of geodetic networks and topographic information from large scale survey built up over many years and subject to continuous revision. With changes constantly taking place, the costs of setting up and maintaining the database have been charged to the Operating Account as incurred. As a substantial part of this asset consists of information akin to intellectual property, it cannot be valued with any certainty. Consequently, no value for the National Topographic Database appears in the Balance Sheet, notwithstanding its central importance to Ordnance Survey activities. (Ordnance Survey 1994, 25)
In October 1994 the results of the 'Framework Review' of the Ordnance Survey were announced. The consultants carrying out the review were asked to consider options ranging from maintaining the status quo as an Executive Agency, to full privatisation. For the present they rejected privatisation, but only on the basis that they were, at present, unable to quantify the full costs of privatisation. They are reviewing the situation over the ensuing four years. If the Ordnance Survey meets its 1997 target of 100% cost recovery, and there is no monetary value placed on the asset base, there must be a clear opportunity for government to privatise, even though there may be fears that the taxpayer investment may be sold cheaply. If privatisation were to be undertaken with a full valuation of assets the challenge of putting a price on the Database may be an accountancy and consultancy dream.
One general trend has been that geographic information is being viewed by many governments as a potential commodity that can be traded. The literature on the implementation of geographic information systems warns that up to 90% of a project's costs can be data. Conventionally no more than 40% of project costs are incurred by hardware, software, and staff, so there may be a considerable business to be developed. Yet information is a long-term resource, and is seldom suitable for short-term profit-taking without incurring problems at a later stage. Information is expensive, but it can become cheaper by using new technologies and methodologies for collection, and through careful market development. Care in market development is even more important where pan-national data are involved. Blakemore and Rybaczuk (1993) note the challenges that exist for the development of European data series, where different national policies exist on openness, privacy, confidentiality, pricing and availability.
6. MARKETING INFORMATION
How should governments market information? Indeed, should they even be involved at all in marketing? Marketing is a short-term activity. Research and Development is longer term, but those involved in marketing focus on the next income/profit target. Marketing focuses not only on whether the internal market is satisfied, but also on the needs of external customers, and through comparative analyses of competitors in the market. However, there are seldom instances where producers of official statistics are in a truly competitive situation. Being protected (at least in the regulated past) by legislation as sole producers of information there would be a significant up-front investment requirement before a new information provider could be properly competitive. That situation may not even occur since if the official provider was recovering only the residual cost of marketing the data, then pricing levels would be set below the level of commercial profit. A competitor would be unable to set prices to recoup the initial investment; see Rhind (1992) for a discussion on the possible implications of GATT free trade agreements.
So should information collection and marketing be a privatised function'? If so how are information activities to be costed prior to privatisation? In the UK the privatisation of utilities saw their assets fully costed - valuing physical infrastructure is relatively straight forward. Information is much more difficult. Collection costs are fixed, but digital data can be used many times over without increasing costs significantly.
Whatever the problems, marketing is a growing activity within government information services. The UK Central Statistics Office appointed a Head of Marketing and Sales during the summer of 1994. Statistics Canada has started to promote sales of data, through regional offices and through partnerships with large commercial organisations. Statistics Finland (Tammilehto-Luode 1994) has defined what is free and what is chargeable. Free services include news services for the media and basic telephone advice. Chargeable services include printed publications, data banks, information on magnetic media, methodological and consulting services, training services, business registers, specialist computations, interviews and surveys. In 1993 sales were 28 million Finnish marks. More interesting than the level, which represented 18% cost recovery, was the breakdown of sales: 55% were from special computations, 26% from publications, 18% from interview services, and only 1 % from databases. Statistics Finland's pricing structure is variable. They price freely on economic grounds, on the basis that too high a price depresses the market, and too low a price represents unfair competition through commodity dumping and unfair subsidy. The principles seem to allow both profit-taking and below market pricing at the same time
The primary aim of Statistics Finland's fee-paying activities is not to maximise profits, nor does the profit margin have to be the same for all products, as it may vary according to the stage of a product, or according to the target group for which it is intended. (Tammilehto-Luode 1994, 6)
Balancing short and long term pressures is one of the biggest challenges for marketing. It requires a sensitivity both to strategic customers in government, and commercially paying customers in other sectors. Who will be the most influential, those who are working on policy, or those who can pay the most? Can timeliness and quality be built into sales contracts, with clear compensation and penalty clauses? Commercial customers who receive delayed data need more than glib apologies and assurances, especially where their commercial viability is being threatened. The marketing of intellectual property will remain complex and controversial.
7. REINVENTING GOVERNMENT
There is a strong temptation for governments to regard information as an asset to be leased, sold or privatised. There is a risk, however, that politicians and the civil service are the wrong groups to develop the market. No multinational business would finance its operations in the way that governments fund theirs through taxation; as Handy (1994, 224) notes, they finance both the national debt and capital expenditure out of borrowing. The Civil Service also is poorly positioned to develop a market. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) note that civil service bureaucracies, such as the federal bureaucracy in the USA, were developed with a major objective being to stop radical and sudden change. In the 1890s
To end the use of government jobs as patronage, the Progressives created civil service systems ... they created independent public authorities. To limit the power of political bosses, they split up management functions ... The product was government with a distinct ethos: slow, inefficient, impersonal. [but] Today's environment demands institutions that are extremely flexible and adaptable. (Osborne and Gaebler 1982, 13-15)
The speed of modern society is challenging both public and private structures. The USA National Performance Review (Gore 1993) aims to reduce the size of the federal bureaucracy, establish a National Information Infrastructure (NII). A part of the NII is the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) established by Presidential order in April 1994. The information will flow to all citizens via the 'Information Superhighway', and currently any country that wants to be viewed as being IT oriented is promoting its own version of what the Superhighway will do for them (CCTA 1994). However, the Superhighway will take rather longer to reach the developing world where on average there are only five telephone lines per 100 people, and the developed world has 45 telephone lines per person. Ballentyre (1992) challenges the claim that electronic superhighways will widen access to information, arguing that the uneven development of advanced telecommunications will exacerbate existing differences, not reduce them.
The term 'reinventing' government is widely used (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992) to group together processes which aim to increase efficiency and accountability of government, to reduce costs and promote enterprise, encourage dissemination of information while protecting individual privacy. Vice-President Al Gore's priority items are: encouraging private investment; providing and protecting competition; providing open access to the information network; avoiding the creation of information 'haves' and 'have-nots'; encouraging flexible and responsive government action. To achieve this will require a delicate, perhaps unique, balancing act between profit-driven and democracy-driven goals. Carrol (1994) is sceptical about this being achieved, arguing that there are two conflicting visions; the 'couch potato' superhighway motivated by entertainment and retail opportunities with strictly commercial goals, and the 'cerebral' superhighway that does not have an immediately financially profitable future.
The restructuring of the functions of the UK government has been under way for the past 10 years and has included
Such a range of initiatives would have been expected to produce radical change within most organisations. Yet when compared to the private sector the change is not that significant. The UK Civil Service has spent £4 billion on IT since 1990, with plans to spend nearly £6 billion up to the year 2000. Similar levels of IT spending have been reported in the privatised British Telecom, which has reduced staff from 250,000 to 150,000. In the equivalent period the Civil Service reduced from 570,000 to 555,000. While the UK government has restructured the functions of government it as yet has not done the same for the staffing structures. With a few exceptions such as the GB Ordnance Survey (1994) where management has been de-layered, the laws on employment protection have served to fossilise the intense hierarchy of the civil service. Modern flexible organisations are 'de-layering' management structures, and some multinational companies now have only five layers of management. Contrast this with a conventional multi-layered civil service and its complex reporting and administrative procedures.
Questions must remain as to whether government is best suited to develop an information (indeed any) market. Similarly, it is sensible also to ask whether a market developed only by the private sector can balance the long term national strategic needs with short-term profit taking. Branscomb (1994) argues that
It seems unlikely that proposals to privatise all government information distribution would meet with enthusiastic endorsement. Whether any lessons can be learned from past experience, other than the gathering and distribution of information is best achieved through a cooperative arrangement between the public and private sectors, is not clear. (Branscomb 1994, 172)
8. REINVENTING PARTNERSHIPS
The 'reinventing' and 're-engineering' process, both in the UK and the USA, may not be happening at the speed originally intentioned. In the UK the processes of contracting out and competitive tender may have reduced unit prices, but they are often just a cheaper way of doing the same as before, and the same as before still suffers from the same organisational inefficiencies as before. A recent review of the USA process noted that there is more to reinventing than reducing the number of civil servants; the organisational structures of the federal bureaucracy may need radical attention
In order to re-invent government properly, the purposes, duties and priorities of departments and agencies have to be re-examined from scratch. The government has to ask what it does best, and where it is unnecessary. Sometimes - indeed, almost always - whole cultures will need changing. (Economist, 17 September 1994, p.58)
Whelan (1994) warns of the danger that just saving money by competitive tender may lead to a fragmentation of activities, where not overall vision exists of core customers.
Successful companies are those that have a clear sense of vision and strategy. The new role for government must also be about vision, goal-setting and steering, with an emphasis on end results. It demands a shift of focus from Treasury-driven preoccupation with efficient government to a focus on effectiveness. (Whelan 1994, 48)
Public and private partnerships are becoming attractive options when developing an information market. Both have limitations, and both have strengths. The private sector (Reuters 1994) can be every bit as secretive with information as government, and the Reuters report cites the political and economic reasons for restrictive dissemination of information within the private sector. Some of the findings include
So, it is sensible to combine the best of both structures. The GB Ordnance Survey has developed many co ventures to widen its product base and respond more rapidly to market requirements, and this has been achieved without diluting the ownership of the intellectual property. In August 1994 the UK Central Statistics Office announced its first private sector partnership with Taylor Nelson AGB. The agreement relates to 90 annual reports, and 36 quarterly collections of official data on businesses, with projections of £1-3 million a year profits which will be shared between the two partners. The National Online Manpower System (NOMIS) has been run on behalf of the GB Employment Department Group by the University of Durham. The contract is awarded through competitive tender at a fixed price, whereby the strategic needs of the Department are served and external marketing delivers a significant level of cost-recovery. It is possible, therefore, for government to save money, receive an increased level of service at a reduced real cost, and for the wider user community to receive added-value access to government information. Equity is held by the owner, risk off-loaded onto those best positioned to take it, and benefits are shared. Such arrangement, however, can only be developed where copyright is held.
9. THE FUTURE?
The lack of copyright could, in some circumstances, impinge on aspects of national sovereignty. Consider the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 1 :24,000 scale topographic maps. These are the basic scale maps for the USA, not protected by any copyright. They comprise some 57,000 sheets. Projections for integrating and updating them into a coherent digital topographic database do not foresee completion until the early 21st century. It is technically and legally feasible for a low labour-cost developing nation to purchase the maps and digital files at minimal cost, update them from commercially available remotely-sensed imagery according to market priorities (there would be no real need for them to deal with remote and sparsely populated areas unless it was profitable), and resell the USA's own maps back into the internal market, this time claiming commercial copyright.
One of the most frustrating aspects of the debates in dissemination and costing is that we are often planning the future of our economies and societies on data which are 2-15 years old. We use state-of-the-art hardware and software with official statistics that still are produced mostly to administrative, not market, targets. There is often little to be gained arguing over the philosophy of access when the basic data are not up to the job. Confrontation is an easy option - blame the statistics, the statisticians, and techniques, the timeliness. Assume that someone else should pay to rectify problems and convert data into the format you specifically need. Someone, somewhere, is paying. That someone else is all of us, but it may no longer is feasible financially to assume a broad brush position that we are all in this together, so let the information out. Accountability and openness do not just relate to dissemination of information, but also to the custodianship of taxation income provided by citizens.
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