SIE 526, Cadastral and Land Information System
Vincenzo Marotta
1. ABSTRACT
The evolution of the land tenure system in Mexico is derived by the fusion of two different arrangements: (1) the system developed by the native indigenous population , and (2) the other brought by the Spaniards. The land tenure system elaborated by the Indian society was a patriarchal village-type landholding with a democratic character. However, the communism system went under an extensive modification, which destroyed gradually whatever equally was formerly existed, and creating individual holdings. The general trend of the colonial period was also toward the accumulation of land in few hands. This unequal distribution of land and other minor factors were responsible for the War of Independence in Mexico during the nineteen century. Porfirio Diaz was the most remarkable ruler during the post-colonial period of Mexico. Its regime saw rapid economic growth and industrialization, but landholding became more concentrated than ever. The revolution broke up in 1910, and the new nationalist and populist government was committed to the peasant class. A redistribution of land was proceeded throughout Mexico on the basis of the constitutional principles established by the Article 27. The Agrarian Reform imposed a maximum legal limit on privately owned land to avoid land-feudalism and land distribution occurred gradually over decades. However, since the 1940s the new agrarian bourgeoisie started to monopolize the highest productive regions thanks to their political and financial acquaintances. The corruption of state officials also facilitate illegal land grabbing. Actually in Mexico a small minority number of powerful, well capitalized enterprises holds the best land, controls the country's agricultural economy and export market. In contrast to a vast majority of impoverished small holdings, laking of technology, financial resources, credit, access to markets, information and training, provide less than the necessary income to sustain the peasant family. Mexican Agriculture is in crisis and the government interventions to assist the ejidos have failed in the past. Mexico needs real land reform that takes into consideration the ability of the Indian population to participate fully in the modernization of rural Mexico. The ejidos and agrarian communities have to be given the resources they need, and empowered with their own decision making.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The evolution of the land tenure system in Mexico is derived, as with many of the Latin America Countries, by the fusion of two different arrangements. The first system was established by the native indigenous population (Maya and Aztec), and it reflects their social organization, while the second system, brought by the European invaders (Spaniards), was imposed and adapted to the previous one.
When the conquistadors landed in Mexico, the area was inhabited by 600 Indian tribes living at different stage of social and cultural development. Some were conducting a nomadic existence mostly within the north semi-arid plains and in the mountain of the Sierra Madre. They had no conception of real property rights. Instead, in the central plateau and on the peninsula of Yucatan, where the majority of indigenous population settled, agriculture was the basis for their economy. Cultivable land played an important role inside the community of a village and the lend tenure system was developed for the benefit of the community. This land tenure system had influenced the land tenure patterns throughout Mexican history and some of its features have been incorporated into the agrarian code of contemporary Mexican land reform (Wetten, 1948, 76).
2.1 THE MAYAN CIVILIZATION
Mayan civilization ruled during the 250-1200 D.C. period, and socially it was organized in four classes: nobilty, priesthood, common people and slaves (Powelson, 1988, 217). The first two were considered the elite castes, in opposition to the others being the lower ones. Indeed, these two classes had to pay tribute to the rulers, give presents to the local lords and make offerings to their gods through the priests (Powelson, 1988, 217).
Most of the Mayan's land was owned communally and the concept of exclusive ownership was completely unknown to them. The land was distributed to the families and because of the variation in land quality, the allocation was regulated by a powerful individual, called alcaldecol by the Spanish. However, the elites had some kind of ownership to land through each they could buy or sell land but only in certain limits.
All the improvement to land were not transferable: houses, trees, etc. belonged to the person who built or planted them. If the land was assigned to another person, the new designated individual "owned" only the land unless he paid for them.
Noble Mayan families, rather than land, could own only a portion of land surrounding a well, a spring or a depression area to collect water, but boundaries were not delineated. The owners and the rights to land were recognized through the "common knowledge" rule. Land rights also could be extended to family members and inherited through the male successor. However, farmers had only the rights to agricultural activities on communal land, and the rights could be transferred to their heirs (Powelson, 1988, 218).
2.2 THE AZTEC EMPIRE
At the time of Spanish conquest, a powerful empire, rose from the federation of three city-states (Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan). They had successfully conquered and controlled a large portion of the central Mexican region. This empire is well known as the Aztec state (Simpson, 1937,3).
The early democratic Aztec society was organized in tribes, each of them was composed by twenty different clans (called calpulli). Components of a clan were the families whose heads participated in decision-making meetings. The land was free, commonly held, and distributed among the families based on their needs. However, this democratic administration and distribution were being modified by the introduction of class distinctions and vested interests (Simpson, 1937, 4). Indeed, by the 16th century, nobilty was accumulating such quantities of land (and serfs), that the Spaniards recognized it as a feudal system similar to their own.
At the time of Spanish conquest, the Aztecs had become a hierarchial military society, where the most highly valued member was a soldier rather than a farmer and he was awarded for his military heroism with land, wealth and social rank (Powelson, 1988, 218). The emperor, called tiatoany, was the owner of the land on behalf of the empire. The land was distributed among the tehcutli, who were the highest officials in the army and worked by others. Even though they were originally elected, by the 16th century the tehcutli acquired their title by inheritance. The son of tehcutli was called pilli and, although, land was communal, he in practice could inherit the land of the fathers (Powelson, 1988, 218)
The land tenure system elaborated by the Aztec society was a village-type landholding. It was developed with a democratic character, in which each Aztec had rights to land. Also the rights of possession were clearly identified and well enforced (Tannenbaum, 1968, 3).
The aggregate of land surrounding an Aztec village and belonging to the community was known as altepetlalli. The whole land was distributed among the calpulli (clans) composing the village. The untilled portion of the altepetlalli, belonging to a certain clan, could be used only by the member of that kinship group. The cultivable portion, on the other hand, was divided in smaller plots called tiatmilli and assigned to the head of families in the calpulli (Simpson, 1937, 4). There was also a public land designated to the temples and the priests (teocalli).
The allotments of land parcels to the household heads was made by one of the elders named pariente mayor. He kept a picture map of all lands of the clan, indicating their boundaries, the quality of the land, the name of the occupant and the various crops under cultivation. He usually kept up-to-date the map frequently, indicating new assignments and changes. (Wetten, 1948, 77).
The landmarks were marked off by stone walls, rows of trees (maguey), irrigation ditches or paths. The clan protected their boundaries jealously, inflicting often severe punishments to the intruders, reserving them even the death penalty for the removal of a benchmark (Whetten, 1984, 78). There was no written title to the individual lots, and the families owned only the usufruct which was also transferable from father to son. However, the families could lose the privilege to the land if (1) they did not cultivate the land for two consecutive years or (2) moved away from the village or become extinct.
This patriarchal communism went under an extensive modification which destroyed gradually whatever equally was formerly existed creating a form of tenure that resembled the individual holding of post conquest days.
First the parent mayor become gradually considered as a different member of the clan and received special lands (pillali) for his support. These lands were larger than the other individual lots, cultivated by serfs (mayeques) and regarded as personal properties of the pariente mayor family: they were indeed transferable by hereditary rights.
Second, some nobles named teules received land as a reward for their courage showed in the battle field or for other notable services to the community. This possession could be transferred to the heirs upon inheritance. In addition, the temple land, increased in size and was tilled no longer by the people of the village, but by the serfs to support the considerable sacerdotal class.
At the time of the Spanish conquest, nobles, overlords, chiefs, priests and other privileged individuals were a large growing group and landless peasants (known as tialmatil) were definitely a social class. The large Aztec estates resulting by these changes, can be considered as the great-grandfather of the modern Mexican hacienda (Simpson 1937, 5).
2.3 THE SPANISH CONQUEST
When the Spaniards arrived in Mexico, two forms of landholding were developed by the indigenous population: village landholding and individual held estates. The conquerors were familiar with both the land tenure system, and measures were taken to protect and foster them. The Spanish Crown, indeed, established legislation to ensure sufficient land to the new and old Indians for their adequate support. The fundo legal (town site) measuring 600 varas (about 500 meters) from the church to all directions was instituted. The land outside the village was called ejido and it was used as agriculture, wood and pasture land for the village. The land, however, was owned by the Crown and plots were awarded to individuals.
In spite of the regulations, designed to protect the landholding village, other forms of land tenure were developed to detriment of the community. These new forms bore out as a Crown's reward for the colonization. The most effective of these was known as repartimientos or encomiendas (Wetten, 1948, 81). These consisted of allotments, protected by the law, of certain number of villages and carried with the rights to collect tribute from the population that lived in the district. The pre-existing land tenures of the Aztec private estates was a favorable environment for the establishment of such a feudalistic type economy so familiar to the Spaniards. In fact, they simply took the place of the defeated Indian chieftains, and continued to collect tribute and services from the Indians.
However, at first the encomiendas were regarded as temporary arrangements
but successively a series of decrees extended the term from one to at least five generations. Soon, in spite of royal orders, the system gradually developed into e feudalistic pattern of land tenure, where the district assigned to the encomendero was seen as his personal property and the Indians living within as his serfs (Wetten, 1948, 81). Other forms of land ownership were established such as (1) the peonia and (2) the caballeria. The size of these land holdings were much inferior to the encomiendas, however they frequently served as a nucleus around which to accumulate larger holdings. This aggrandizement took place through different ways such as (2) the confiscation of Indian holdings, (2) the marriage of an Indian women who owned lands or (3) the occupation of unclaimed lands (McBride, 1923, 51-52). It is believed that many haciendas (the future large estates) are born by this process of gradual annexion and consequence confirmation of title (Watten, 1948, 92-93).
Moreover, the Church, which considered itself the protector of Indian, during the colonial regime, gradually acquired very large holdings. The clergy had been, since the beginning, an economically privileged class (Whetten, 1948, 94). Their members received grants of land from the King of Spain, and built monasteries, churches and residences thanks to the financial efforts of the crown itself and the Spanish population. The native population instead furnished the unpaid labor. This was also the time when several religious orders erose, among them the Jesuits.
In addition, the Church had an advantage in respect to layman encomenderos, that is, they did not need any type of income source to build their own houses as did the encomenderos (Whetten, 1948, 94). Furthermore, the Church held these lands perpetually and, as result, the clergy was one of the most powerful landholder of the New Spain by the end of the sixteenth century. The amount of land held by the Church is unknown: estimates have varied between one-half and three-fourths of the total area of the Republic (Tannenbaum, 1929, 7). From this immense prestige, it is not surprising that the Church dominated the colonial era economically and politically (Wetten, 1948, 94).
The Spanish colonial legislation attempted to protect the Indian, and as result many of these native groups succeeded in preserving their freedom. However, those were the ones living in the mountainous sections of Mexico. The best land was on the plains, it was subdivided in large estates and the Indian inhabitant became serfs of the conquerors and their descendants. The general trend of the colonial history is, therefore, the accumulation of land in few hands (Tannenbaum, 1929, 7).
In the later years of the colonial period the Crown took steps towards the breaking up of those vast accumulations of land. The most significant was the abolition of encomiendas and the confiscation of the property of the Jesuit order. The excessive inequality of land distribution had affected the agricultural production of the country, and an alarming decline was observed in both the mother-country and in the colonies (the encomiendas were already existing in Spain since the period of the conquest). The abolition of encomiendas was a slow and gradual process born with the intent to dismember these large holdings. From this time, a movement toward the division of the land and the creation of small holdings started to take a precise form in Mexico (McBride, 1971, 60-61)
One of the most recognized events toward the division of land in Mexico was the confiscation of the property of the Jesuit order during the eighteen century. By the year 1767, this order held a large of number of haciendas in Mexico whose the majority was of great size and located in the most productive part of the country (McBride, 1971, 62).
2.4 THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE IN MEXICO
Since the arrival of the Spaniard in New Spain, the Indian were gradually deprived of their holdings or allowed to remain as serfs. The unequal distribution of land and other minor factors were responsible for the War of Independence in Mexico during the nineteen century (1810-1821). The war, indeed, was largely motivated by the agrarian ambitions of the Indians (Tannenbaum, 1968, 8). The end of the war, however, did not extirpate the evil from the system abated. The accumulation of land in few hands was maintained much as in colonial times, many of these estates passed from Spaniards to Mestizos (the native Indian) or to Creoles (mixed Indian-Spanish born Mexicans) (McBride, 1968, 66).
Never less, the war did lay the basis for three elements that contributed to the attempted break-up of the large estates in Mexico. It led to (1) the abolition of legal inferiority of Indians, (2) abolition of entailment of large holdings and (3) ultimate confiscation of church lands, which was completed at the end of the Three Years War (1857-1859) (Tannenbaum, 1968, 8-9). As result of these acts, some of those large properties resulted divided, but many others passed unbroken (Whetten, 1948, 98). In addition, this Reform, contrary to its original intent, caused the attack of the communal land of the Indians that protected by the Spanish Crown, survived throughout the colonial period (Tennenbaum, 1968, 10).
2.5 THE DIAZ REGIME
Porfirio Diaz was the most remarkable ruler during the post-colonial period of Mexico (Tennenbaum, 1968, 138). He took office in 1876 keeping his power until 1911, except for the presidential period of 1880-1884. His rule was considered the most constructive in hundreds of years of the Republic. The Diaz administration was centered toward a rapid industrialization of the country by developing railroads, public utilities and stimulating the mining industry. These changes increased the flow of foreign investment in Mexico and as a consequence it led to a rapid rise in land value, but land speculation also. From here on, the Mexican government developed a land policy that was deleterious for the country (Tennenbaum, 1968, 138).
The attempt to destroy the feudal character of the Mexican land system was also defeated by the Diaz regime. The confusion already existing in the Mexican land system, which derived due to imperfect title, was enhanced by the land policy of Diaz. In 1883, in order to develop colonies in some of the most remote region of the Republic, a law was amended through which private companies (companias deslindadores) were empowered to carry out the survey of the land. In return, those companies received a third of the land surveyed as compensation of the work done and in addition they could buy the remained two-thirds at special rates (Simpson, 1937, 27).
This system of distribution of public land set up a period of land grabbing and speculation that brought one-fifth of the entire geographical area of Mexico in the hands of 29 private companies (Slmpson, 1937, 28). During this time, every owner became subject to the manipulation of the surveying companies whose purpose was correcting and revising their titles. Many titles of small dimension properties were declared defective and denounced. Since the titling interpretation was subject to officials who were persuaded monetarily, land monopolization increased as never during the colonial times. The Indians who were less prepared and unable to protect their untitled land from the rich grabbers, were pushed off from their lands. The Diaz regime saw rapid economic growth and industrialization, but landholding became more concentrated (Tannenbaum, 1968, 14).
In addition to land issues, the Diaz administration failed in regard to the racial problems existing in Mexico. Indeed, it showed continuously an aversion toward the Indian population and their institution. The destruction of the Indian communal institutions was believed to be the hope for the Mexican economy and the Diaz Policy was toward a replacement of the Indian population with foreign immigration (Tannenbaum, 1968, 14-15).
2.6 THE REVOLUTION AND THE REFORM
The policy of the Diaz regime had brought rapid economic growth and a pronounced concentration of wealth in the hands of few individuals. However as a counter effect, the peasant villages lost most of their land, while inflation exceeded the increase of agricultural wages, and the standard of life for the masses in Mexico was lowered. These elements combined with other economical and industrial factors weakened the power of the central government creating the premises for the Mexican Revolution (Tannenbaum, 1968, 155).
The revolution broke up in 1910 and ended seven years later with the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz. The new nationalist and populist government was committed to the peasant class, and particularly during the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas ( 1934-1940 ) a redistribution of land was proceeded throughout Mexico on the basis of the constitutional principles established in 1917 (Article 27) (Rello, 1986, 1 ). The agrarian legislation created a central organism, the National Agrarian Commission (NAC), that carried out the restitution or the donation of the lands to the villages. It was a very powerful agency whose dictates could fulfill or deny the aspiration of thousands of Indian villages. The commission was composed of nine members and acted as final decision maker in the process of turning lands over to villages. The NAC received the records from the local agrarian commissions and could approve or disapprove the decision taken by the state authorities, modify, enlarge, reduce the area provisionally allowed in possession. Its final judgment was than passed back to the local authorities for execution (Tannenbaum, 1968, 224-226).
The agrarian land reform (embodied in the article 27 of 1917) of the post-revolution period was, therefore, carried with the intent to redistribute the land among the peasant communities which were deprived unjustly of their rights to land during the nineteenth century. As a consequence, the expropriated owner did not receive any compensation for the dispossession, and the reform beneficiary was not required to pay for the land granted (Eckstein, 1978, 18).
Land distribution occurred gradually over decades, and the process in Mexico differed substantially from other Latin America countries, that is the state generally was the initiator for the titling operation. However, the peasant communities had to submit an initial petition and the process between the submittion and the provisional grant was completed in about five years. In addition, for the ejido to gain the definitive title, it was required a further grace period of seven years. Until the 1930s, only few modernized estates were expropriated representing 6% of the country land (Eckstein, 1978, 18). After that, the process accelerated and by 1940, 22% of the farmland was redistributed among more than 50% of the agricultural population. After 1940 the redistribution slowed down again until 1960 when peasant pressure produced an increase of re-allotment. The last major expropriation took place in 1975 and since then reallotment was almost null mostly because there was no more available land (Dale, 1988, 35).
The large farms were divided essentially into ejidos, the communal land for the villages and within it, individual lots were assigned individually to the ejidatarios. Furthermore, some ejidos were tilled in cooperative as corporations (known as collective ejidos), others were farmed individually (individual ejidos) or were mixed. The ownership in the individual ejidos was vested by the community and for this reason it could not be sold, rented, mortgaged or given away, but it could be inherited. In addition, an ejidatario could lose its right to land if he abandoned it. However, this problem could be solved by bribing local officials who could arrange the abandoned land to another ejidatario or to a private outsider. These subterfuges made de facto the communal land and the individual plots to be conveyed as private properties (Dale, 1988, 35). Also there was the tendency to split the original groups in smaller ones, and by 1960 the number of Mexican ejidos dropped about one half of the original number (Eckstein, 1978, 20).
3. CONTEMPORARY LAND TENURE IN MEXICO
The Agrarian Reform imposed a maximum legal limit on privately owned land (individual ejidos) to avoid land-feudalism. However, since the 1940s a small group of agricultural entrepreneurs (the new agrarian bourgeoisie) who operating with modern technology and mechanization contributed to the greater part of the agricultural production, started to monopolize the highest productive regions. This land-grabbing was possible through false titles that generated neo-latifundio whose size and resources exceeded the best ejido parcel (Rello, 1986, 3).
In this new capitalistic vision the ejidos represented an obstacle for various reason, among them an excess of bureaucracy and corruption. As result, renting ejidos parcels became a widespread practice in contrast to the agrarian legislation that forbidden such transactions. However, the agrarian bourgeoisie could evade the anti-latifundia laws, nominally dividing their estates into separate entitlement held officially by others acting as a front. These illegal operations were possible because they had the support of the political party (Simpson C, 1994, 3). As result, the most productive (and irrigated) district fell into the hands of private individuals who built large land holdings without formally owning the land ( Rello, 1986 , 3 ) . Chiapas was an example of corruption of state officials, protecting large landowners and cattle ranchers, who monopolized two million hectares that represented one half of the entire state's land (Carrigan, 1 995, 77).
In addition to political favors, they had also links to the country's financial and commercial elite. Consequently, credit, technical assistance was concentrated in these large productive estates. Also, as in many states, the economic and political powers were themselves large landowners or cattleman. Thus, the lack of the rule of law had permitted the erosion of the ejido land, the growth of a labor surplus and the maintenance of low rural wages.
Actually in Mexico two agricultural systems exist: (1) a small minority number of powerful, well capitalized enterprises holding the best land, controlling the country's agricultural economy and export market and ( 2 ) a vast majority of impoverished small holdings (Burbach, 1994, 2). In contrast to the large rich estates, these minuscule ejidos are characterized by absence of technology, financial resources, credit, access to markets, information and training. Often these holdings provide less than the necessary income to sustain the peasant family. These farmers, even though beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, have been squeezed in poor or medium quality lands. About 80% of the peasants in Mexico lived under these conditions accounting for no more than 25-30% of the total agricultural production (Rello, 1986, 2).
In 1991 President Salinas modified the agrarian legislation (article 27 ) by making possible the sale, leasing and investing of individual plots. With this new law Salinas hoped that the redistribution program was officially ended and a modern agriculture system commenced. However, many peasant groups such as the State Council of Indigenous and Campesino Organization (CEOIC) of the State of Chiapas believed that more illegal farms needed to be redistributed. This process could contribute to the fragmentation of the ejidos with deleterious consequences on indigenous customs and autonomy. The Salinas' administration hoped that the land would, instead, fall into the hands of productive farmers and corporate investors. However, since the minuscule private ejido parcels were still without technological training and access to credit, the agrarian situation in Mexico is still unchanged, with most of the land in the hands of few (Johnson, 1995, 25).
Never less, some economic and agricultural analysts believe that the Salinas' effort was leading to the right direction. They are of the opinion that communities need and are able to make their own decisions regarding land matters. The problem was that the community did not have the technology and the financial power necessary to support the program (Johnson, 1995, 25).
4. CADASTRAL SYSTEM
Land titling has been promoted as the key for the economic growth of developing countries. Because it embodies the property rights to land, the owners feel their property is under legal control and protected from frauds. They are incentives to invest on their properties and consequently the income could be greatly improved. The administration of the land is, therefore, an essential step toward the economic development of a third world country. An efficient administration of land can be achieved with a modern cadastral information system.
A cadastre is an official depository of land information, and it generally contains the ownership, extent and assessed value of the land within a given area. Also it shows the administrative boundaries and property lines. Originally, cadastral maps and survey were used to develop parcel maps for taxation purposes, however, these maps do not necessarily represent the legal authority for the taxation or ownership. It is the actual surveyor's note that provides this power. A land record system could be composed by the following five different components:
(1) Record of all deeds or any real estate transactions,
(2) Cadastral Map
(3)Fiscal Cadastre
(4)Numerical Cadastre
(5)Registration of Title
The first component records all the significant changes of ownerships that occur in a certain parcel over the years. The second component is an archive of officially recognized maps of parcel boundaries, that in order to be efficient, an updating process in necessary. The term fiscal cadastre refers to a cadastral office where the delineation of property boundaries are not reported with accuracy. The third component is, instead, referred as a complete record of all accepted boundary surveys (Braasch, 1975, 41). The registration of title office is a legal registry where the certification of ownership (title) is recorded and made available for the public at any given time.
5. CADASTRAL INFORMATION SYSTEM IN MEXICO
Probably one of the most old cadastral maps of Mexico is represented by the Oztoticpac Lands Map discovered and named by Howard F. Cline in the 1960s. It is a map that provides an inventory of various properties (land, palace, trees) whose ownership was in dispute (see Figure 7.1). It is the most important manuscripts of the early colonial postconquest era. The map appears to be drafted about 1540 and probably connected to a ownership over land litigation in Texcoco (Harvey, 1 991, 1 65 ).
The first modern cadastral information system in Mexico is dated back to 1896. Based on a precise land survey, it was created by the cadastral law with the intent to equally distribute land property taxes. The parcels and their improvements were surveyed and plotted at a 1: 500 scale map on cardboard and copied on textile material for blueprint reproduction. The survey started in 1899 and was carried out in urban areas, at first a fourth order triangulation set and its densifier transverses were established . All the urban blocks coordinates were then determined based on this first reference system. The survey method was carried out in all of whole Mexico without any changes until 1970, when a second generation of modern cadastres took place.
For this second project 750,000 urban parcels located in 400 towns and villages needed to be recorded. At this time photogrammetric and topographic survey methods were applied and a data bank information system was established to enact an efficient fiscal and legal control. The data bank was also used to link two ten-digit identifier numbers, a geographic one, associated to each parcel, and a personal one. A third innovation to the cadastral system was carried out in the Federal District of Mexico seven years later with the intent to implement an integral, automated, multipurpose information system.
The needs of an Integral Cadastral Information System (ICIS) come from the fact that the Federal District of Mexico is one of the largest urban areas in the world. The district contains about 1,150,000 parcels which generated an enormous amount of cadastral information such as physical, economical, administrative, legal and fiscal data. In addition to the great volume of data, the maintenance and operating costs were very high. Therefore, it was necessary and convenient to organize a database system capable of efficient processing such a large quantity of land information at a lower cost.
The new system was established to satisfy the following objectives:
-to contain all cadastral data
-to maintain all the information in an up-to-date manner
-to quickly provide information for the public and private sector
-to adequately support decision making processes
-to efficiently organize cadastral works
The system was developed in three stages in order to gradually implement the changes into the existing system. During these phases three sub-systems were designed with the possibility of incorporating additional new sub-system. In the first one (the value sub-system) the calculation of cadastral values, was carried out. The second phase consisted of the organization of a cadastral database (the informational sub-system) designed with the intent of considering the actual needs and the existing computer system. The third stage was developed to consolidate the work carried out by the first two phases of the project.
5.1 THE VALUE SUB-SYSTEM
The objective of this sub-system was to calculate the cadastral value of each parcel and its improvements. The land value calculation was based on the surface area, form, frontage, depth, location within the block and unit value of the parcel. The improvement value was obtained by considering the area, volume, levels, classification, conservation status, age and unit value of the building. The information utilized for these computations was acquired from cadastral maps, field investigations and electronic files containing unit values of parcel/buildings.
The Value Sub-system consisted of 24 different programs used for(1) the integration/listing of the processed records, (2) validation of processed information, (3) verification/correction of cadastral identifiers (geographical and personal), (4) calculation of property value/tax,(5) conversion of the information into diskette format,(6) creation of a Master file for blocks, streets, zones and indexes,(7) merging in single files all information processed. During the development of this sub-system, the programs were tested and the result analyzed.
5.2 THE INFORMATION SUB-SYSTEM
The information sub-system was designed to avoid duplications of information, to handle a large volume of information, to operate quickly and to reduce the maintenance and operating costs. It consists of two group of programs: the first define the structure of the database, the second one authorizes access to the database for information retrieval, loading and up-dating. Similar to the value sub-system, during the development of this sub-system, personnel was trained, the programs tested and the results analyzed.
The new Integral cadastral Information System permitted achievement of several objectives such as systematization of the cadastral data, up-dating of information, efficient support for the decision makers, fast accessibility of data and optimization control of the land (Dobner, 1983, 9).
6. PRESENT SITUATION
In 1995 despite, economic troubles, Mexico initiated a program called National Cadastre Modernization Program (NCMP) sponsored by Mexico's National Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL). The program had the objective of implementing a Geographic Information System to manage land records in Mexico. The Mexican Government hoped that the improvement of property record management would stimulate and benefit the country's economic development. In order to nationally promote the program, SEDESOL organized a conference in their office in Mexico City attracting more than 300 local, state/national officials, and private companies. SEDESOL encouraged the implementation of a geographic information system supporting the following expected benefits from a GIS:
-increasing revenues from first-time taxation of previous unrecorded properties
-attracting of foreign investment
-improvement of problem resolution
Two cities, Tijuana and Ensenada, are implementing GIS under a program called Cadastral Application for Tijuana and Ensenada program (CATE). The cities are shearing the costs for developing a database management system capable to handle all data maintenance, reporting and valuation needs as well as interfacing with the graphic portion of GIS. The program is close to completion, however, as of April 1997, I lacked further information about the success or failure of the CATE program. However, promoters hope that the program will be easy to use and the lower price can give incentive to other municipalities to follow the path undertaken by the cities of Tijuana and Ensenada (Klein, 1995, 64).
7. CONCLUSION
Mexican agriculture has been the most studied agrarian system in the world (Burbach, 1994, 20), and it is agreed that Mexican agricultural is in crisis. Grain production, that mostly comes from the ejidos, represents the great plague of Mexican economy (Burbach, 1994, 20) due to its decrease in price at the world level (Bellon, 1996, 380).
With this perspective, President Salinas introduced the Procampo program, a government system of subsidies. Under this program farmers can receive funds and are able to shift gradually from deficient grain production to more profitable areas of productions such as fruits and vegetables.
Such result is, however, unlikely. Under the Procampo project, the producer will receive about $ 100 per hectare per year. This amount is not enough to carry out a change over process for new crops, indeed, for strawberry production $ 10,000 per ha. Is necessary, while $ 2,300 is the minimum subsidy for broccoli production (Burbach, 1994, 20).
The inability of Mexico to feed its own people is rooted in the poverty of the rural class that constitutes, as we have seen, the majority of the Mexican population. Some analysts advocate the elimination of the ejidos and the marginal agricultural producers because they can not compete in the present market place. They argue that the interventions sponsored by the Mexican government to assist the ejidos have failed in the past, leaving the agricultural sector uncompetitive, undercapitalized and under productive (Burbach, 1994, 20).
This failure however does not depend on the primitive character of the ejidos system nor due to the lack of initiative of the peasantry. As David Barkin argues in Distorted Development, a prejudice conception was created around the poor farmers. This situation favored the urban industrial economy at expense of the agricultural sector (Burbach, 1994, 22). In addition, as in many cases, the ejidos are relocated in the marginal areas scarcely fertile, and essentially are cut off from market access.
Mexico needs real land reform that takes into consideration the ability of the Indian population to participate fully in the modernization of rural Mexico. The ejidos and agrarian communities have to be given the resources they need, and empowered with their own decision making. To succeed, the peasant population of the small ejidos need political freedom, that must be combined with the access to credit, technical and commercial support services. From a more technical point of view, a modern cadastral system is not a priority in resolving the land tenure system in Mexico. A modern cadastral system is already existing in Mexico City and more cities are experiencing the implementation of a geographic information system. Thus a legal infrastructure and a credit reform must come first.
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